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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. LARSON, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 920711-CA 
vs. : Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a : 
Pennsylvania corporation; 
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS : 
COMPANY, a Delaware 
corporation; et al., : 
Defendants-Appellees. : 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Larson does not claim that any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules are determinative of the issues on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of facts 
Larson objects to PPG Industries7, Inc. ("PPG") statement of 
uncontroverted facts as they are not presented in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 
104, 107 (Utah 1991). Further, PPG cites to fact which are 
irrelevant and have no purpose other than improperly swaying the 
Court's decision. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states 
that the statement of the case shall include "[a] statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review. . . . " Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(7). 
PPG in its statement of facts refers to the availability of 
the purifying respirator and rubber gloves available to workers, 
PPG further refers to a washroom in the work area. These facts are 
not relevant to the issues before this court and should not be 
considered for purposes of this appeal. 
PPG alleges in their statement of uncontroverted facts that 
plaintiff does not trust doctors. The depositions do not support 
this statement. The deposition statements state that plaintiff 
does not like to go to hospitals because he becomes nauseated and 
because plaintiff had not previously required treatment by doctors. 
(R. 1542-43) 
PPG asserts that plaintiff did not consider these matters 
serious. The depositions do not support this statement. Deposi-
tions support a finding that plaintiff was concerned about his 
symptoms, but did not see a doctor unless it was incapacitating. 
(R. 1540) 
PPG alleges that witnesses have disappeared, memories have 
faded, that it is virtually impossible to determine whether 
symptoms are caused by TCE, that evidence has been lost, that it is 
impossible or nearly impossible to determine whether Black & Decker 
used the vapor degreaser appropriately and whether the employees 
followed policy. These statements are self-serving, conclusory and 
are arguments inappropriate in a statement of uncontroverted facts 
and should not be considered in the Court's determination. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISCOVERY RULE IS APPLICABLE 
TO HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES. 
Application of the discovery rule to cases of products 
liability is appropriate where discovery of the cause of injury 
could not reasonably have been known by plaintiff. In cases where 
the discovery rule is not applied by statute or where there is no 
concealment by defendant, the test for applying the discovery rule 
is whether "application of the general statute of limitation rule 
would be irrational or unjust." Klinaer v. Rightly. 791 P.2d 868, 
872 (Utah 1990). 
PPG alleges in Point I of its brief that the discovery rule of 
the statute of limitations does not apply to products liability 
cases. PPG further asserts that the discovery rule should only 
apply in cases involving a claim of professional malpractice where 
there is reliance or trust. The Utah Supreme Court, however, has 
not limited application of the discovery rule to professional 
malpractice cases. See Allen v. Ortiz, 802 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1990) 
(applying the discovery rule to a libel action); Myers v. McDonald. 
635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) (applying the discovery rule to a 
wrongful death action). Further, contrary to PPG's assertions, it 
is proper to look to other states to see whether application of the 
discovery rule is appropriate in a products liability case. See 
Allen v. Ortiz, 802 P.2d at 1313 (review of other states' applica-
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tion of discovery rule to defamation cases) ; see also Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 11-14. 
The Supreme Court has held that application of the discovery 
rule is appropriate in cases where there are special circumstances 
justifying tolling the limitation. In Allen v. Ortizf the court 
stated, "[p]otential plaintiffs should not be barred from suit if 
they did not know and could not reasonably have known of the facts 
giving rise to a cause of action . . . ." Allen, 802 P. 2d at 1313-
14. 
In cases where the injury or cause of the injury is difficult 
or impossible for the plaintiff to discover, application of the 
discovery rule is appropriate. Id. The cause of action for libel 
in Allen did not begin to run until the libel was known or could 
have been discovered through reasonable diligence. Id. at 1314. 
It is irrational and unjust to apply the general statute of 
limitations in a hazardous material exposure case where it is 
difficult or impossible to discover the cause of the injury until 
several years after the injury originally occurred. The discovery 
rule is therefore necessary to avoid injustice. 
Discovery of the cause of injury is an appropriate date at 
which to apply the statute of limitations. The court in Foil v. 
Balinqer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), held that where there was a 
lack of knowledge as to the cause of plaintiff's suffering until 
years after the injury occurred, the claim was not defeated by the 
statute of limitations. The court stated, "[w]e see no basis for 
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making a legal distinction between having no knowledge of an 
injury, as was the case in Christiansen, and no knowledge that a 
known injury was caused by unknown negligence." Id. at 148. The 
court applied the discovery rule and tolled the statute of 
limitations until plaintiff knew the cause of his injuries. 
Because application of the discovery rule in hazardous 
material exposure cases is necessary to prevent injustice, 
application of the discovery rule is appropriate in this products 
liability case. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF NEED ONLY SHOW LACK OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
OR THAT A REASONABLE PERSON WOULD NOT HAVE 
KNOWN OF THE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES. 
PPG alleges that plaintiff must make a showing of due 
diligence to discover the injuries and causes of the injuries 
before application of the discovery rule will apply. However, the 
standard that PPG urges this court to adopt goes beyond that which 
is required by the Utah Supreme Court. In Klinaer v. Rightly. 791 
P.2d at 872, the Utah Supreme Court applied the discovery rule but 
did not find that the plaintiff must show due diligence in 
discovering the cause of injuries. The court instead looked at 
whether there was actual knowledge by the plaintiff of the cause of 
injury. The court in Klinaer found that there was no reason for 
plaintiffs to suspect that they had been injured. "They had no 
reason to suspect that the survey was inaccurate, nor did they 
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refrain from doing anything that might reasonably have been 
expected of them that could have disclosed the error." Id. 
Just as in the Klinaer case, Mr. Larson in this case did not 
have reason to suspect that TCE was the cause of his abnormal 
collection of symptoms. He did not affirmatively refrain from 
seeking medical help, but did make some inquiry of his family 
physician. None of the symptoms by itself was of sufficient 
gravity to demand that he seek further medical help, and there is 
no evidence to indicate that he should have believed the symptoms 
were related. Because there was no actual knowledge of the cause 
of his injuries, Mr. Larson could not be expected to have filed a 
lawsuit during the four-year period after his injuries. Such 
knowledge is not within the scope of an ordinary lay person. 
PPG cites to O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 
1139 (Utah 1991), and Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125 
(Utah 1992) , for the proposition that there is an affirmative duty 
of due diligence upon plaintiff to show that he could not have 
known the cause of his injuries. However, 0/Neal did not require 
a showing of due diligence, but granted summary judgement on the 
basis that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the cause of his 
injuries. This knowledge precluded him from applying the discovery 
rule. O'Neal involved a minor who was an alleged victim of sexual 
abuse who sued the Division of Family Services for alleged 
negligence. The court stated: 
In the present case, O'Neal contends that his 
case presents exceptional circumstances be-
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cause although he knew the facts underlying 
his cause of action, he was psychologically 
unable to reveal them, much less to pursue his 
legal remedies. The difficulty with O'Neal's 
argument is that it seeks to have us apply the 
balancing analysis suggested by the Myers case 
without first focusing on the prerequisite to 
any application of the discovery rule—igno-
rance by the plaintiff of the facts giving 
rise to the cause of action. 
O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d at 1144 (emphasis 
added). Thus, O'Neal does not require plaintiff to show due 
diligence in finding the cause of injury, but merely denies 
application of the discovery rule unless there was "ignorance by 
the plaintiff of the facts giving rise to the cause of action." 
Id. 
The court in Warren v. Provo City Corp., reviewed whether the 
failure to obtain information from Provo City regarding the 
maintenance of a plane involved in a crash justified application of 
the discovery rule. However, Warren differs in that the plaintiff 
in Warren was also not ignorant of the facts giving rise to the 
cause of action. The Warren court stated: 
The fact that the plane crashed gave Warren 
reasonable grounds to question whether Provo 
was enforcing Ordinance 13.03.060 in requiring 
Western Flyers to keep its airplanes in air-
worthy condition. Furthermore, the fact that 
Warren's counsel phoned Provo City Airport in 
June of 1989 indicates that Warren knew of the 
requirements of Ordinance 13.03.060 well 
within the one-year period. However. though 
Warren knew of the ordinance and should have 
been on notice that the ordinance may not have 
been enforced, the only inguiry he undertook 
was to make an unspecified number of phone 
calls to Provo City Airport. 
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Warren v, Provo City Corp,f 838 P.2d at 1129 (emphasis added). 
Thus# due to the plaintiff's knowledge of the injury and possible 
violations in Warren, the court denied application of the discovery 
rule based on the special circumstances exception. 
In this case there is no indication that plaintiff knew of the 
cause of injuries until watching the television program regarding 
TCE in the fall of 1984. Nor could plaintiff reasonably have known 
of the harmful effects of TCE as those effects were not within 
common knowledge until 1984. Even if there were a requirement of 
due diligence to discover the cause of injuries, the evidence 
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff indicates 
plaintiff has met that burden in attempting to question his 
physicians about the causes of his seemingly unrelated symptoms and 
in immediately visiting his physician upon actual knowledge of the 
harmful effects of TCE. 
POINT III 
THE DISCOVERY RULE IS WARRANTED IN PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY CASES WHERE THE CAUSE OF THE INJURIES 
MAY NOT BE LEARNED UNTIL YEARS AFTER EXPOSURE. 
PPG alleges that even if it were proper to apply the discovery 
rule in a products liability action, the plaintiff has failed to 
show exceptional circumstances requiring application of the 
discovery rule. However, the discovery rule is appropriate in 
cases where the causes of the injuries may not be learned until 
years after the exposure. See Appellant Brief, pp. 9-14. Further, 
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the court in Klinaer v. Kiahtlv stated after reviewing the reasons 
for applying the discovery rule, 
[w]e held that the discovery rule should be 
applied where "[t]he hardship of the statute 
of limitations would impose on the plaintiff 
in the circumstances of [the] case outweighed 
any prejudice to the defendant from difficul-
ties of proof caused by the passage of time." 
This balancing test is a question of law. 
Klinger v. Kicrhtley, 791 P.2d at 873 (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 
635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981)). 
The court in Klinaer went on to hold the prejudice to 
plaintiff from being completely barred outweighed the prejudice to 
defendant occasioned by the passage of fourteen years7 of time such 
that "presumably, the memories of the members of the survey party 
have dimmed." Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872. 
Applying the balancing test to this case, application of the 
discovery rule is appropriate. Application of the statute of 
limitations to a plaintiff who could not reasonably have known at 
the time his symptoms had manifested themselves that his injuries 
were caused by contact with TCE is unjust and requires the 
application of the discovery rule. Further, although memories may 
have faded with the passage of time, witnesses are still available 
to testify in behalf of both the plaintiff and the defendant. The 
burden of proof is on the plaintiff who bears the difficulty of 
proving the cause of action. The court in Mvers v. McDonald 
stated: 
Defendant cannot establish that he was pre-
judiced by having to defend a stale claim 
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since his problems of proof occasioned by the 
delay are no greater than the plaintiffs. In 
contrast, plaintiffs could not file an action 
for damages or even initiate investigative 
efforts to determine the cause of death of 
which they had no knowledge. 
Myers. 635 P.2d at 87. 
Application of the discovery rule is appropriate in cases 
where the causes of the injuries may not be learned until years 
after the exposure. The prejudice against plaintiff far outweighs 
the difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time. 
POINT IV 
CAUSATION IS AN ISSUE PROPERLY DETERMINED 
BY THE TRIER OF FACT. 
PPG improperly raises an issue not previously raised in its 
motion for summary judgment. Defendant alleges that plaintiff has 
not adduced sufficient evidence of causation of plaintiff's 
injuries by the chemical TCE. PPG cites to Reeves v. Geiav 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah App. 1988), for the 
proposition that expert affidavits must be submitted to show 
causation of the injury; however, defendant raises this issue 
inappropriately, as it was not raised by defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 300-302) and is now raised for the first time 
on appeal. 
Unless special circumstances can be shown warranting the 
failure to raise an issue prior to appeal, courts have generally 
held that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Warren v. Provo Citv Corp. 838 P.2d at 1128 n.4; Sharp v. Ros-
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kelley. 818 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah 1991); Standard Federal Savings & Loan 
Assn. v, Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Utah 1991). 
Even assuming this issue were appropriate for appeal, this 
issue should be determined by the trier of fact. Further, 
plaintiff has provided substantial evidence indicating that TCE was 
the cause of his injuries. The court in Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceu-
tical. Inc.. 764 P.2d at 640, states: 
Appellant contends that, even without opposing 
affidavits, the record before the trial court 
demonstrated a genuine issue of disputed 
material fact to be resolved by the fact-
finder, namely, whether his injuries were 
caused by the drugs. We agree. 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the court in Reeves did not require 
expert affidavits, but stated that the record was sufficient to 
show that this was a disputed issue of fact which would be more 
appropriately determined by the factfinder. 
Defendant further relies on King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, 
832 P.2d 858, 864 (Utah 1992), where there was a question of 
whether a spontaneous abortion was caused by an intrauterine device 
or whether it was caused by negligence in the implantation by the 
doctor. The Supreme Court found that there was a material issue of 
fact as to causation and stated, M[w]e are guided by the general 
judicial policy that favors a trial on the merits when there is 
some doubt as to the propriety of the summary judgment." Id. at 
864-65. The court further stated, fl[i]n sum, we held that Searle 
has not demonstrated the absence of a material issue of fact as to 
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whether the Cu-7 was the cause of plaintiff's injury." Id. at 865 
(emphasis added). 
Plaintiff need not further substantiate his claims of 
causation by expert affidavits, where defendant has failed to show 
the absence of a material issue of fact. Further, in this case, 
just as in the Reeves case, the depositions do provide evidence 
that the TCE was the cause of plaintiff's injuries. (R. 566-68, 
570-74, 580, 813-15, 861-82, 1000-04, 1018-19, 1083-1086, 1145-46, 
1465-74, 1520, 1528, 1549-52, 1567-69, 1574-77). 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), 
differs from the present case in that there was an intervening 
cause of death by a burglar or a friend of the victim, and there 
was no indication of forced entry or use of a pass key. Thus, the 
court found that causation had not been shown in any form and that 
the causation of the victim's death was pure speculation. This is 
further apparent from the court's citation to Staheli v. Farmers' 
Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982), which 
involved a fire in a shared storage facility of grain. The court 
found that the possibilities of the cause of the fire were so 
numerous as to be "unlimited in scope." Id. at 682. 
Plaintiff, through depositions, has shown a link of TCE to the 
cause of his injuries. Where, as in this case, there has been a 
direct link to the cause of injuries, there is enough to raise a 
factual issue for a jury to make a determination. King, 832 P.2d 
at 864-65; Reeves, 764 P.2d at 640. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have known TCE 
caused his injuries. The statute of limitations did not run under 
the doctrine of the discovery rule prior to the filing of plain-
tiff's complaint. The facts presented to the trial court would 
support a finding that the defendant caused the plaintiff's 
injuries and is liable under products liability and negligence 
theories. Summary judgment was improper, and the dismissal should 
be reversed. 
DATED this // & day of August, 1993. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: / 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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